Security Gates¶
The shared security target combines Python static analysis, dependency
vulnerability auditing, optional package-specific dependency checks, and one
repository-wide scan of tracked source for high-confidence credential material.
bijux-canon-dev owns normalization of the pip-audit report; Make owns tool
execution and artifact paths; package profiles own explicit exceptions and
additional checks.
flowchart TD
source[Package source] --> bandit[Bandit]
environment[Resolved dependencies] --> audit[pip-audit]
audit --> json[pip-audit.json]
json --> gate[bijux-canon-dev audit gate]
profile[Package security policy] --> gate
profile --> extras[Package-specific dependency checks]
bandit --> verdict[Security target verdict]
gate --> verdict
extras --> verdict
tracked[Git-tracked regular files] --> secrets[Credential scan]
secrets --> verdict
Gate Composition¶
| Target | Input | Output beneath artifacts/<package>/security/ |
|---|---|---|
security-bandit |
configured Python source paths | bandit.json, bandit.txt, isolated bytecode cache |
security-audit |
active environment or prepared requirements | pip-audit.json, pip-audit.txt, optional requirements file |
security-deps |
package-specific helper targets | adapter-specific reports or refusal |
| root credential scan | Git-tracked regular files | artifacts/root/security/secret-scan.json |
security |
all four surfaces | combined exit status |
Bandit excludes generated build, artifact, tox, mypy, and pytest-cache paths by
default. High-severity, high-confidence findings are mandatory and fatal.
SKIP_BANDIT and rule-ID skip lists are rejected instead of being treated as
successful analysis.
Dependency Audit Policy¶
The audit path produces machine-readable JSON and a human-readable report.
When the repository helper is configured, security.pip_audit_gate accepts
either pip-audit’s list form or its dependency-envelope form and evaluates
every vulnerability.
flowchart LR
report[Audit JSON] --> parse{Readable and recognized?}
parse -- no --> strict{Strict mode?}
parse -- yes --> remaining{Findings remain?}
remaining -- no --> pass[Pass with counts]
remaining -- yes --> strict
strict -- yes --> fail[Nonzero refusal]
strict -- no --> visible[Visible non-strict continuation]
The repository does not admit vulnerability-ignore IDs. Package profiles and direct gate invocations reject them before interpreting a report. Resolve an advisory by updating or removing the dependency; a future exception mechanism must first provide checked-in owner, reason, exact scope, and expiry metadata.
Strict and Non-Strict Behavior¶
SECURITY_STRICT=1 is mandatory:
- a Bandit refusal fails its target;
- a missing, malformed, or unexpected audit report exits with configuration failure;
- vulnerabilities fail the audit target;
- a pip-audit invocation failure remains nonzero.
The Make target rejects non-strict mode. Direct use of the report interpreter may remain useful for diagnosis, but it is not an admissible security result.
The combined target preserves the tool’s nonzero status. Wrappers must not append unconditional success, discard the report, or treat an absent JSON file as an empty vulnerability set.
Tracked-source credential scan¶
After every package gate succeeds, bijux-canon-secret-scan enumerates files
from Git rather than walking the worktree. It scans tracked regular text files,
records every scanned file's SHA-256 identity, and reports only finding type,
path, and line number. Potential secret values are never copied into evidence.
Binary files are identified by a NUL-byte preflight and listed as skipped.
The initial high-confidence signatures cover AWS access-key identifiers, GitHub classic and fine-grained tokens, OpenAI API keys, and private-key PEM headers. Any finding is fatal. Enumeration failures, unreadable files, non-regular tracked paths, and report-write failures are configuration errors; the scanner does not reinterpret them as a clean result. This repository scan complements deployment-system secret detection and credential rotation; it does not claim to discover every possible secret format.
Investigation Order¶
| Symptom | Inspect first | Normal response |
|---|---|---|
| Bandit finding | rule ID, source line, JSON confidence/severity | correct the code; required findings cannot be suppressed |
| audit vulnerability | package, installed version, all IDs/aliases, fix versions | update dependency and lock; assess consumers |
| unreadable report | pip-audit invocation and pip-audit.json |
repair tool/environment; do not classify as clean |
| audit invocation code greater than one | pip-audit.txt, environment, index access |
treat as tooling failure rather than vulnerability verdict |
| package dependency refusal | package adapter report | correct the package’s declared boundary |
Retain both JSON and text artifacts. JSON supports deterministic processing; text records the operator-facing interpretation and invocation failure.
Scope of the Claim¶
These gates establish static Python findings and known vulnerabilities in the audited dependency resolution under the checked-in policy. They do not by themselves prove:
- runtime isolation, authorization, or tenant separation;
- safe handling of every external tool or model response;
- absence of leaked secrets in deployment systems;
- container, host, or network hardening;
- exploitability or non-exploitability of an ignored advisory.
Product packages document their own threat boundaries and runtime controls. Deployment systems remain responsible for credentials, network policy, sandboxing, patch cadence, and incident response.
See Quality Gates for evidence selection, SBOM and Supply Chain for dependency inventory, and the package security guide for product-specific controls.