Known Limitations¶
bijux-canon-runtime makes execution authority, causal history, verification,
and divergence inspectable. It does not make an external tool trustworthy,
turn registered checks into factual truth, or provide distributed isolation and
durability by itself.
Mode Guarantees¶
flowchart LR
manifest["manifest and authority"] --> mode{"run mode"}
mode -->|plan| plan["resolved plan only"]
mode -->|dry-run| simulated["simulated execution trace"]
mode -->|observe| observed["host-supplied observed events"]
mode -->|live| governed["governed live execution"]
mode -->|unsafe| unsafe["relaxed, non-equivalent execution"]
| Mode | Package output | Claim that must not be made |
|---|---|---|
plan |
resolved immutable plan; no execution trace or run ID | that any tool ran, side effect was authorized, or result was verified |
dry-run |
simulated events, artifacts, and persisted lifecycle evidence | that live permissions, latency, provider behavior, or side effects were exercised |
observe |
governance over events supplied by the host | that omitted host activity was reconstructed or controlled |
live |
execution under declared authority, determinism, verification, and persistence contracts | that external content is true or external effects are transactionally reversible |
unsafe |
explicit relaxed execution with finalized evidence | equivalence to a governed live run or eligibility for certification |
Non-plan runs require an explicit execution store. Live, observe, and unsafe execution also require the applicable verification policy. Defaults select behavior; they do not create hidden databases, credentials, or deployment resources.
Installed Composition Boundary¶
Runtime v2 composes the canonical packages through domain application services and retains their results in one causal artifact graph. This does not make all profiles equivalent:
offline-lexicalis complete in the base wheel and schedules no model or dense operation;- dense and hybrid work requires the
local-cpuextra, a pinned materialized model, compatible native backends, and a validated vector dimension; - model acquisition is explicitly networked, while validation and reuse can be network-disabled;
- the optional hosted-provider surface is not required for core acceptance and must not be inferred from local provider abstractions;
- the legacy manifest execution API remains a compatibility surface; new whole-product integrations use Runtime v2.
Replay Is Evidence-Bounded¶
Strict replay is a refusal policy over the captured envelope. It can detect differences in recorded authority, plan, policy fingerprint, dataset descriptor, environment fingerprint, entropy use, events, tools, and artifacts. It cannot compare a field that was never captured or recover an external artifact that was deleted.
A seed cannot control provider upgrades, mutable remote data, wall-clock services, parallel hardware, unversioned tools, or hidden host state. Bounded acceptability permits only the differences declared in the original replay policy; it must not be selected retrospectively after seeing a favorable result. Human intervention is replayable only when the decision and its meaning-bearing input are retained as governed events.
Verification Is Not Truth Certification¶
A passing arbitration establishes that registered structural, epistemic,
budget, evidence, artifact, and policy rules produced the recorded decision. It
does not establish scientific truth, legal compliance, model calibration, or
completeness of the rule registry. Permissive arbitration and verification
failure modes are policy choices and must remain visible with the
non_certifiable classification.
The host remains responsible for deciding which rules are mandatory for the use case and whether acting on a verified claim is allowed.
Persistence And Recovery¶
DuckDB and the workspace CAS form a durable local authority with migrations, job transitions, causal artifacts, and governed backup/restore. They are not a replicated service, consensus system, or multi-region event log. Copying or editing either store outside the protocol bypasses its identity and integrity checks.
Checkpoints are written after successful steps. An external side effect can occur before its corresponding checkpoint becomes durable. Runtime cannot atomically commit its DuckDB transaction and a provider call, filesystem mutation, or remote database write. Resumable integrations therefore require idempotency identity, deduplication, or compensation at the executor boundary.
The single-writer guard uses exclusive creation of a lock file and records the writer process ID. Stale-lock recovery tests that PID for liveness. This model assumes a local filesystem and a shared interpretation of process IDs; it is not a safe coordination protocol across hosts, containers with independent PID namespaces, or filesystems whose create and visibility semantics are unsuitable for locking.
Artifact Availability¶
The installed v2 composition publishes immutable payloads to the workspace CAS
and metadata plus causal edges to DuckDB. New-format inspection fails closed
when a required payload, edge, locator or digest is missing. Legacy runs created
before source-archive retention may report legacy-unresolved; that status is
not equivalent to verified provenance.
Runtime backup authenticates admitted payloads and the workspace database, but the host still owns encryption, retention, access control, integrity monitoring and capacity. Tenant identifiers in records are not filesystem or database isolation. Hashes cannot reconstruct deliberately deleted bytes.
HTTP And CLI Posture¶
The installed server exposes Runtime v2 only and defaults to loopback. It has no built-in authentication, tenant authorization, TLS termination, sandboxing, distributed quota, or multi-writer coordination. Durable submissions require idempotency identities, and result, inspection and artifact payloads use explicit bounded follow-up reads.
The CLI advertises init and the complete local-first v2 group. The older
manifest commands and v1 ASGI module remain compatibility surfaces but are not
the primary product workflow. The explicitly hosted v1 run and replay routes
remain unimplemented; the installed server does not mount them.
Deployment Boundary¶
Runtime is not a process sandbox, cluster scheduler, identity provider, TLS terminator, or secret manager. Execute untrusted tools behind operating-system or container isolation; enforce tenant access outside the in-process authority token; and keep credentials out of manifests, traces, replay envelopes, artifacts, and diagnostic events.
See the risk register for failure signals and controls, and the test strategy for executable evidence.